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T
he U.S. current account deficit has grown steadily since 1991,
hitting record levels of 3.6 percent of GDP in 1999 and 4.4 per-
cent in 2000. In recent years, the growing deficits have increas-
ingly raised concerns. For instance, most economists who took part in a
recent Wall Street Journal forecasting survey agreed that the current
account deficit is the major threat facing the U.S. economy (Ford). Some
policymakers have also suggested that the large and growing U.S. cur-
rent account deficit may be unsustainable and thus may create problems
for the economy.
This article examines the causes and consequences of the large cur-
rent account deficits in the United States. The first section of the article
identifies the potential sources of the large deficits. Much of the rise in
the current account deficit over the past decade can be attributed to two
factors: accelerating U.S. productivity and a surge in household wealth
driven by the stock market. The second section examines whether the
U.S. current account deficit is sustainable in the near term. In this analy-
sis, an unsustainable deficit is defined as one that triggers a sharp hike in
interest rates, a rapid depreciation of the dollar, or some other domestic
or global economic disruption. The article concludes that, over the near
term, deficits of roughly the current magnitude are sustainable and
therefore unlikely to disrupt the U.S. economy.
Jill A. Holman is an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Steve Lamberty,
formerly a research associate at the bank, helped prepare the article. This article is on the
bank’s web site at www.kc.frb.org.
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Holman.qxd  4/25/01  2:46 PM  Page 5I. WHAT CAUSED THE DEFICITS OF THE 1990s?
Explaining the rise in the current account deficit shown in Chart 1
requires considering a range of other variables.1 Many of these variables are
part of the U.S. economy’s external sector: the trade account, international
financial flows, and the exchange rate. Movements in the current account
deficit are due primarily to movements in the trade deficit (box). The cur-
rent account deficits are financed by net capital inflows from abroad.
Finally, the exchange rate is related to the current account because interna-
tional transactions (including trade in goods, services, and financial assets)
generally require exchanging dollars for foreign currencies.
Among the many different forces that affected the behavior of the
U.S. external sector from 1990 to 2000, two factors are key. First, the
rise in the U.S. current account deficit reflects a surge in investment
spending caused by accelerating U.S. productivity.2 Second, the boom-
ing U.S. stock market in the 1990s enhanced household wealth and
consumer spending, causing the deficit to widen further. In the last few
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Chart 1
THE U.S. CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT
AS A SHARE OF GDP
Note: Figures are based on annual data for the current account deficit and GDP .
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
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years, moreover, the deficit may have been boosted by U.S. economic
performance and U.S. financial conditions relative to other countries. 
Accelerating productivity may have caused an investment boom
A primary explanation for the rise in the U.S. current account
deficit is the accelerating productivity of U.S. workers compared with
that of workers in other countries. According to figures from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), U.S. productivity (output per hour
worked) in the manufacturing sector grew an average of 4.8 percent per
year from 1995 to 1999 (Table 1). In 1999, manufacturing productivity
increased an astonishing 6.4 percent. By comparison, U.S. manufactur-
ing productivity grew at an average pace of just 2.7 percent per year
WHAT IS THE CURRENT ACCOUNT?
A country’s international trade in goods and services and international
borrowing and lending are recorded in its balance of payments accounts. The
balance of payments consists of two main accounts: the current account and
the financial account.†
The current account measures the change over time in the sum of three
separate components: the trade account, the income account, and the trans-
fer account. The trade account measures the difference between the value of
exports and imports of goods and services. A trade deficit occurs when a
country imports more than it exports. The U.S. trade deficit is by far the
largest component of the U.S. current account deficit. In fact, fluctuations
in the trade deficit are the primary cause of fluctuations in the current
account deficit. The income account measures the income payments made
to foreigners net of income payments received from foreigners. For the
United States, the income account largely reflects interest payments made
by the United States on its foreign debt and interest payments received by
the United States on its foreign assets. An income deficit arises when the
value of income paid by the United States to foreigners exceeds the value of
income received by the United States from foreigners. The transfer account
measures the difference in the value of private and official transfer payments
to and from other countries. The largest entry in the transfer account for
the United States is foreign-aid payments.
The financial account measures the change over time in a country’s
international borrowing and lending. When a country borrows in the inter-
national market, it sells domestic assets to foreigners, and financial capital
flows into the country. When a country lends in the international market, it
Continued on following page
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from 1980 to 1994. No other major industrialized country has experi-
enced such a large increase in productivity growth.
The surge in U.S. productivity has led to an investment boom.
Since 1991, U.S. gross private domestic investment as a share of GDP
has risen steadily, reaching 17.7 percent in 1999 and a postwar high of
18.3 percent in the first half of 2000 (Chart 2). This rise in investment
was likely a response to the rapid technological change that underlies
the acceleration in U.S. productivity.3 Technological advances have led
many firms to expect productivity to grow faster than ever before.
Faster productivity growth raises the economy’s potential to produce
goods and services. The increase in potential supply should translate over
time into an increase in the actual amount of goods and services pro-
duced by the economy. That is, over time, a rise in productivity growth
should boost the rate of output growth. Producing more output in the
buys foreign assets, and financial capital flows out of the country. A financial
account surplus occurs when a country borrows more than it lends, so that
more financial capital flows into than out of the country. Therefore, a finan-
cial account surplus is called a net capital inflow. Similarly, a financial
account deficit is referred to as a net capital outflow.
A country’s financial account is the sum of two components: private cap-
ital flows and official capital flows. Private capital flows consist of foreign
direct investment, private purchases and sales of equity and debt, and bank
flows. Official capital flows are primarily used by governments to change their
holdings of foreign currency.
Conceptually, the balance of payments accounts must sum to zero. That
is, the following accounting identity must hold:‡
Current Account Balance + Capital Account Balance = 0.
The accounting identity indicates that if a country experiences a deficit
on its current account, it must simultaneously experience a surplus on its
financial account. Intuitively, when a country runs a trade deficit, it finances
the deficit by borrowing from abroad.
† U.S. international transactions were previously measured by the current account and the
capital account. Now, international transactions are measured by the current account, the capi-
tal account, and the financial account. The previous capital account has been renamed the finan-
cial account. The new capital account, which measures some of the unilateral transfers that used
to be counted in the current account, is small in comparison to the current account and the
financial account. Thus, the new capital account is ignored in the text. See Warnock (2000).
‡ This accounting identity only holds approximately in the data. Reasons for the statistical
discrepancy include unrecorded international capital flows, illegal drug trade, and other interna-
tional transactions that are unreported to evade commercial policies such as tariffs and quotas.
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Chart 2
INVESTMENT AS A SHARE OF GDP
Notes: Investment is defined as gross private domestic investment. Figures are based on annual
averages of investment and GDP .
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
Table 1
THE GROWTH RATE OF
MANUFACTURING PRODUCTIVITY FOR THE U.S.
AND OTHER G7 ECONOMIES
Average Average
1980–94 1995–99 1999
United States 2.7 4.8 6.4
Japan 2.1 2.4 3.1
United Kingdom 3.6 0.7 3.6
Germany 3.3 4.8 2.5
France 4.2 4.1 3.3
Italy 3.5 1.6 2.1
Canada 2.6 1.2 3.8
Note: Figures are percent per year.
Source:  IMF
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future, though, requires more investment today. Thus, investment in
the United States has risen sharply.4
Widely accepted economic theory predicts that if a country experi-
ences an investment boom due to a rise in productivity growth while its
trading partners do not, its current account deficit should widen. Hold-
ing all else constant, the increase in productivity raises domestic invest-
ment spending, causing total domestic spending to exceed domestic
production in the short run. To cover the excess of domestic spending
over production, the country imports more goods and services than it
exports. In particular, the surge in investment may increase the demand
for imported capital goods.
At the same time, the investment boom should affect the financial
side of the economy. The improvement in domestic productivity should
lead to a rise in real interest rates, boosting the return on domestic
assets relative to foreign assets. The increase in the return on domestic
assets attracts the foreign funds necessary to finance the current account
deficit. Thus, an acceleration in productivity should result in a net capi-
tal inflow (corresponding to the current account deficit) and an appreci-
ation of the country’s currency.5
For the most part, developments in the U.S. economy from 1990 to
2000 conform with these predictions from economic theory. The U.S. cur-
rent account deficit has widened as U.S. productivity growth has acceler-
ated. Moreover, the rise in investment spending has been accompanied by
an increase in U.S. capital goods imports as a share of GDP (Chart 3).
Accelerating productivity can account for some, but not all, of the
movement in the dollar’s exchange rate. From 1995 to mid-1998, the
dollar appreciated, in line with the theoretical effects of a technology-
led surge in productivity (Chart 4). The more rapid appreciation of the
dollar in 1998 is at least partly due to global financial market turmoil.
During the Asian and Latin American financial crises, international
investors viewed the United States as a safe haven. As investment funds
flowed into the United States from Asia and Latin America, the dollar
appreciated more rapidly. 
From mid-1998 to mid-2000, however, the value of the dollar
remained relatively stable. In isolation, an increase in U.S. productivity
growth cannot explain this behavior of the exchange rate. Accounting
for this flattening out of the exchange rate requires considering another
factor behind the large current account deficits.
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Chart 4
THE EXCHANGE VALUE OF THE DOLLAR
Notes: Data are monthly. Figures are based on nominal broad dollar index (trade weighted dollar).
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Chart 3
CAPITAL GOODS IMPORTS AS A SHARE OF GDP
Note: Figures are based on annual averages of imports and GDP .
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Increased wealth led to a consumer shopping spree
During the 1990s, a bull market in U.S. stocks dramatically
increased the net worth of U.S. households.6 The values of both the S&P
500 and the Dow Jones Industrial Average more than tripled from
1990 to 1999. As a result, during the same period, the ratio of net
worth to disposable income rose 32.8 percent, putting the ratio of
wealth to income far above previous highs. 
The surge in wealth due to the stock market led to a consumption
boom in the United States, through the so-called wealth effect.7 From
1995 to 1999, real consumer spending grew 4 percent per year, com-
pared to an average of just 2.6 percent per year over 1980-94 (Table 2).
In 1999 alone, consumption spending increased a remarkable 5.3 per-
cent. During the consumption boom of the late 1990s, U.S. consumers
satisfied part of the increased demand for goods and services with
imports, purchasing more and more goods from foreign sources (Table
3). The share of imports in total U.S. consumption spending rose from
2.7 percent in 1990 to an all-time high 3.8 percent in 1999. 
If a country increases its demand for imports due to a consumption
boom, basic economic theory predicts that the country’s current account
deficit should widen and its currency depreciate. Holding all else con-
stant, as a country’s demand for imports rises, its trade deficit should
worsen, causing its current account deficit to grow larger. On the finan-
cial side of the economy, the increased expenditures on foreign goods
increase the demand for foreign currencies, putting upward pressure on
the value of foreign currencies relative to the value of the domestic cur-
rency. Consequently, the country’s exchange rate should fall.8
In combination, consumers’ increased demand for imports and the
productivity-driven surge in investment spending can account qualita-
tively for the recent behavior of the external sector of the U.S. economy.
Both factors helped push the U.S. current account deficit higher. More-
over, the combination of the factors may be enough to provide a general
account of the behavior of the dollar’s exchange rate. Individually, the
improvement in productivity should cause the exchange rate to rise,
while the increased consumer spending on imports should cause the
exchange rate to fall. The dollar appreciated from 1995 to approxi-
mately mid-1998, consistent with the effects of accelerating productiv-
ity. From mid-1998 to mid-2000, the exchange rate remained relatively
steady. One interpretation of the exchange rate’s behavior during this
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latter period is that the downward pressure created by the wealth-
induced consumption spree offset the upward pressure due to the accel-
eration in U.S. productivity.
Table 2
THE GROWTH RATE OF REAL
PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES
FOR THE U.S. AND OTHER G7 ECONOMIES
Average Average
1980-94 1995-99 1999
United States 2.6 4.0 5.3
Japan 2.9 1.2 1.2
United Kingdom 2.5 3.3 4.0
Germany 2.1 1.6 2.1
France 2.0 1.7 2.3
Italy 2.0 2.0 1.7
Canada 2.5 3.0 3.2
Note: Figures are percent per year.
Source: IMF
Table 3














Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Other recent factors
Since 1998, two other factors may have played a role in causing the
large U.S. current account deficits. First, the United States and the rest
of the world have been at different positions in their business cycles.
While the U.S. economy expanded rapidly from 1998 through the first
half of 2000, the economies of many U.S. trading partners did not per-
form as well.9 Moreover, developing economies in Asia and other
regions experienced financial turmoil and even crisis. These short-term
developments have caused U.S. imports to rise and U.S. exports to slow,
further widening the U.S. current account deficit.
Second, overall financial conditions in the United States may have
been stimulative in 1999 and early 2000. The Goldman Sachs Financial
Conditions Index, for example, indicates conditions were highly stimu-
lative during this period (Goldman Sachs a and b).10 Such financial
stimulus may have caused the current account deficit to widen further
and put downward pressure on the dollar.11 Stimulative financial condi-
tions boost aggregate demand, causing domestic expenditures to further
exceed domestic production, in turn causing the current account deficit
to rise. At the same time, stimulative financial conditions can lead
households and firms to revise upward their expectations for future
inflation. Because inflation erodes the value of a currency, rising infla-
tionary expectations should place downward pressure on expectations of
the dollar’s future nominal exchange rate. Expectations of a slower rate
of appreciation of the dollar should lower the expected nominal return
on U.S. assets relative to the expected nominal return on foreign assets.
As the expected return on U.S. assets falls, funds begin to flow out of
U.S. assets and into foreign assets, causing the dollar’s current nominal
exchange rate to fall.12
Summary
The behavior of the U.S. external sector over the past decade can
largely be attributed to two broad forces, along with two relatively
recent factors. Both rising investment spending associated with gains in
U.S. productivity and rising consumption spending associated with
wealth gains can account for much of the increase in the U.S. current
account deficit. In addition, in the past few years, the strength of the
U.S. economy compared with the rest of the world and stimulative
Holman.qxd  4/25/01  2:46 PM  Page 14ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2001 15
financial conditions may have exacerbated the deficit. These factors also
potentially account for the behavior of the exchange rate.
II. IS THE LARGE DEFICIT SUSTAINABLE?
The U.S. current account deficit grew throughout most of the
1990s and into 2000. But, clearly, the U.S. current account deficit as a
share of GDP cannot increase forever without disrupting the U.S. econ-
omy or the global economy. As Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan (2000b) said, “Widening current account deficit[s] require
ever larger portfolio and direct foreign investments in the United States,
an outcome that cannot continue without limit.” This section examines
whether the United States can sustain a current account deficit of
roughly the recent magnitude over the short term.
Economists do not agree on a precise definition of a “sustainable”
current account. In general, sustainability refers to a stable state in which
a current account deficit generates no economic forces of its own to
change its trajectory. In this article, a country’s current account deficit is
defined as unsustainable when (by its own forces) it triggers a sharp hike
in domestic interest rates, a rapid depreciation of the domestic currency,
or some other abrupt domestic or global economic disruption. Using this
definition, a sustainable current account is one that changes in an orderly
fashion through market forces without causing jarring movements in
other economic variables, such as the exchange rate.
Partly due to the lack of a precise definition, no universally accepted
measure of sustainability exists. Many economists gauge sustainability
by examining the value of a country’s external obligations. In this con-
text, two commonly used measures of a country’s international obliga-
tions are the ratio of the country’s current account deficit to GDP and
the ratio of the country’s net international debt to GDP . Although these
two measures are not perfect indicators of sustainability, they can pro-
vide some insight into the sustainability of a country’s current account
deficit. Both ratios, plus some additional evidence, suggest the U.S. cur-
rent account deficit is sustainable in the short run. 
The current account deficit to GDP
A simple and straightforward method of assessing the sustainability
of a country’s current account deficit is to examine the ratio of its cur-
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rent account deficit to GDP . The current account deficit-GDP ratio may
capture the sustainability of a country’s external position in that the
ratio measures the excess of domestic expenditures over domestic pro-
duction as a fraction of GDP .
While there is considerable uncertainty about the precise threshold,
Mann argues that a current account deficit greater than 4.2 percent of
GDP is unsustainable. This estimate, based on the 1980s and early
1990s, represents the average threshold at which current account
deficits in several industrialized economies started to narrow after trend-
ing up for a sustained period. Unfortunately, few other analysts have
offered estimates of the sustainability threshold.
For a variety of reasons, the sustainability threshold for the United
States is likely to lie above Mann’s estimate. First, in general, the aver-
age experience of industrial economies on which the estimate is based
might not be applicable to the United States because the United States’
economic and financial importance in the world economy may make it
“different.” Second, the economic situation in the United States in the
1980s and early 1990s is quite different from the economic situation
today. For example, many observers believe trend productivity and
GDP growth rose in the latter half of the 1990s. An increase in the U.S.
economy’s long-run growth potential is likely to affect sustainability
prospects. Third, the United States holds a special position in interna-
tional financial markets. As the dollar is an international reserve cur-
rency, the demand for dollars and dollar-denominated assets is relatively
strong. Finally, because the dollar is an international reserve currency,
most of the assets sold to finance the U.S. current account deficit are
denominated in dollars. As the dollar does not need to be exchanged for
the currency in which the United States makes payments to borrowers,
U.S. exposure to exchange rate fluctuations is quite limited. For all of
these reasons, the United States is probably not subject to as stringent a
measure of sustainability as other countries. 
Keeping in mind that the Mann benchmark may provide too low a
threshold for the United States, the current account deficits observed in
the recent past and projected for the near future are sustainable. The
3.6 percent deficit-GDP ratio in 1999 is below Mann’s threshold (Chart
5). The current account deficit-GDP ratio for 2000 is slightly above
Mann’s sustainability benchmark. Similarly, for 2001 and 2002, projec-
tions from the IMF and Consensus Forecasts put the U.S. current
account deficit-GDP ratio slightly above Mann’s benchmark. As
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Mann’s benchmark probably provides only a lower bound for the
United States and as the current and projected U.S. current account
deficit-GDP ratios are only slightly above her benchmark, the U.S. cur-
rent account deficit is likely to remain sustainable.13
Net international debt to GDP
Examining the ratio of net international debt to GDP provides an
alternative method for assessing the sustainability of a country’s current
account deficit. Net international debt is the accumulation over time of
current account deficits.14 If an economy runs a current account deficit
consistently, net international debt may become so great that foreign
investors lose confidence in the economy’s ability to service its debt or,
worse yet, repay the principal. Once this happens, interest rates must
rise or the borrowing country’s currency must depreciate to enable the
country to continue financing its deficit. In this case, the current
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Chart 5
CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT TO GDP RATIO
COMPARED TO THE SUSTAINABILITY BENCHMARK
* IMF forecast
† Consensus forecasts
Note: Actual figures for 1990 to 2000 are based on annual data for the current account deficit and GDP .
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, IMF, Consensus Economics, Inc.
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trajectory, and the current account deficit and the associated debt have
become unsustainable.
After remaining low and stable in the early 1990s, the net interna-
tional debt-GDP ratio for the United States rose throughout most of
the decade (Chart 6). By 1998, net international debt had reached a 20-
year high of 12.6 percent of GDP . In 1999, net international debt fell
slightly, to 11.6 percent of GDP .
A net international debt-GDP ratio of nearly 12 percent might
suggest that the U.S. external position is unsustainable. However, com-
paring the U.S. net international debt-GDP ratio with that of other
countries reveals that the U.S. situation is not particularly troubling
(Table 4).15 The ratio for the United States is comparable to that of the
United Kingdom. Moreover, the U.S. debt-GDP ratio pales in compar-
ison to the Australian and Canadian ratios. Australia’s net international
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Chart 6
U.S. INTERNATIONAL DEBT AS A SHARE OF GDP
Notes: Debt figures are the nominal net international investment position with direct investment
positions at current cost, defined as positive values.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
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was close to 40 percent of GDP . Furthermore, Australia and Canada
have had large net international debt-GDP ratios for many years. Yet
neither Australia nor Canada has suffered any significant economic dis-
ruptions because of their debt positions. Hence, the U.S. international
debt position may be unlikely to have any major macroeconomic conse-
quences even if it continues to worsen for the next few years.
Other near-term considerations
Some other considerations also suggest the U.S. current account
deficit is likely to be sustainable in the near term. First, the assets sold
to finance the U.S. current account deficit are mostly long-term assets,
which makes them relatively safe in case of an abrupt, short-term
change in investor sentiment.16 The values of these assets will drop if
investors lose confidence in the United States, but the consequences will
not be as severe as in a country that finances its external deficits with
more short-term assets. Many Latin American countries, for example,
have financed current account deficits with very short-term assets. 
Second, because foreign investors recognize that U.S. assets are rel-
atively safe and offer favorable yields compared with many other coun-
tries’ assets, net capital inflows into the United States are likely to
remain healthy at least in the near future. Although growth in the
United States has recently slowed, unemployment is still low and infla-
tion is moderate. With most forecasters expecting the U.S. economy to
Table 4
NET INTERNATIONAL DEBT AS A SHARE OF GDP










Source: IMF, Bureau of Economic Analysis
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stay healthy, the United States is likely to remain an attractive destina-
tion for foreign capital at least over the near term. 
Third, foreign investor confidence in returns on long-term U.S.
assets has been growing, in spite of the large U.S. current account
deficits, as evidenced by the increasing share of foreign direct invest-
ment in the United States and by rising foreign holdings of U.S. private
assets (Bank of America). Thus, it appears that foreign capital inflows
will continue to provide adequate financing for the U.S. current account
deficit, ensuring that the deficit is sustainable.
Although the U.S. current account deficit will eventually narrow,
deficits of roughly the current magnitude appear to be sustainable in the
sense that any near-term adjustment is likely to be gradual. Both the
current account deficit-GDP ratio and the net international debt-GDP
ratio suggest that the current level and near-term future levels of the
U.S. current account deficit are sustainable. Forecasts of the U.S. current
account deficit-GDP ratio are only slightly above Mann’s benchmark.
Moreover, the U.S. net international debt-GDP ratio is not likely to rise
above the levels that other industrialized economies have experienced.
Finally, other considerations such as the financing of the deficits also indi-
cate any narrowing of the deficit will be orderly, in the sense that there
will not be a sharp drop in investor confidence, a fire sale of U.S. assets, a
steep rise in U.S. interest rates, or a rapid depreciation of the dollar.
III. CONCLUSIONS
After growing consistently since 1991, the current account deficit as
a share of GDP has hit record levels. The acceleration of U.S. productiv-
ity is one of the primary suspects for explaining the behavior of the U.S.
current account. In addition, gains in household wealth due to a boom-
ing stock market may have led to a consumer shopping spree, which, in
turn, may have caused the deficits to become even larger in the 1990s.
Since 1998, the relative economic performance of the United States and
stimulative U.S. financial conditions may have added to the deficits.
The size of the deficit has led some economists and policymakers to
question whether the U.S. external position is sustainable. However,
examining both the current account deficit-GDP ratio and the net
international debt-GDP ratio suggests that deficits of the magnitude
observed in 1999 and 2000 and forecast for the near future are sustain-
able. The most likely scenario is that the U.S. current account deficit
will narrow within the next few years, in an orderly manner.
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ENDNOTES
1 In the charts and tables, deficits are defined as positive values, and surpluses
are defined as negative values.
2 Pakko (1999) makes a similar argument.
3 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the pace of technological advance in the
United States has accelerated. At this point, however, the data required to confirm
these anecdotes are rather limited. Only the most recent data from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics show some signs of an increase in multifactor productivity growth
(a measure of productivity that nets out the contribution of capital accumulation
and therefore corresponds to technological progress). For instance, multifactor pro-
ductivity in the private nonfarm business sector increased 1.5 percent in 1998
compared with 0.9 percent in 1997.
4 In addition to its effects on investment expenditures, a higher productivity
growth rate can lead to an increase in consumption expenditures. Accelerating pro-
ductivity leads to increasing output, allowing households and firms to increase
their consumption and investment spending, respectively. As the effects of produc-
tivity on consumption expenditures are qualitatively similar to the effects of the
stock market boom on consumption expenditures, further discussion of increased
consumption expenditures is postponed until the next subsection of the article.
5 See Mishkin (2001) for a simple textbook treatment of the (partial equilib-
rium) effects of productivity on nominal exchange rates. Of course, other modeling
approaches may lead to different predictions for exchange rate movements in
response to a productivity shock.
6 Capital gains in the housing market also contributed to the increase in the
net worth of U.S. households (Greenspan 1999).
7 Greenspan (2000a and 2000b) cites several pieces of evidence that support
the existence of a wealth-induced consumer shopping spree in the 1990s. How-
ever, the magnitude of the wealth effect is uncertain and is a matter of empirical
debate. In addition to its effects on consumption expenditures, a booming stock
market increases investment expenditures. Higher equity prices reduce the cost of
capital and enable firms to finance purchases of new capital goods with greater
ease. Thus, the run-up in the U.S. stock market in the 1990s reinforced the surge
in investment spending discussed in the previous subsection of the article.
8 See Mishkin (2001) for a textbook analysis of the effects of increased import
demand on nominal exchange rates.
9 From 1998 through mid-2000, U.S. economic growth generally outpaced
economic growth in the rest of the world (IMF 1999). 
10 The real Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index captures a broad range
of financial conditions. The measure is based on a real interest rate, real corporate
bond yields, a real exchange rate, and the equity market capitalization-GDP ratio.
11 Implicitly, this description of events assumes that U.S. financial conditions
were more stimulative than those of its major trading partners.
12 When inflationary expectations rise, the domestic nominal interest rate
should increase, offsetting the downward pressure on the current exchange rate.
Most analysts believe that the effects of a slower rate of appreciation outweigh the
effects of the increase in the nominal interest rate. Thus, when inflationary expec-
tations rise, most economists predict that the current exchange rate falls.
13 Mann (1999) concludes that the U.S. current account deficit is sustainable
for two to three years, but not over the long term.
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14 Formally, net international debt is the accumulation over time of the trade
deficit plus any borrowing that is required to make interest payments on the debt.
15 As this method of assessing sustainability is based on comparing net inter-
national debt-GDP ratios across countries, it is subject to some of the same caveats
as Mann’s sustainability benchmark. Furthermore, as the balance of payments data
suffer from measurement error, the data on net international debt for the United
States may not be completely accurate. One component of net international debt is
the sum of the trade deficit over time. If the trade deficit (a major component of
the balance of payments) is measured inaccurately, a measure based on summing
the trade deficit over time will only compound any measurement errors. Moreover,
net international debt may not be measured accurately due to capital gains and
losses on previously issued assets. The problems with measuring net international
debt are not limited to U.S. data. One indication of the data problems on a more
global level is that the world is running a substantial current account deficit with
itself—J.P . Morgan estimates that the world current account deficit will reach
$245 billion in 2000, which is approximately 3 percent of world GDP (The Econo-
mist 2000). As stated quite eloquently in The Economist (2000), “It appears that we
are importing much more from Mars than we export to it.” The global current
account discrepancy suggests that many countries’ current accounts and net inter-
national debt positions may suffer from measurement error.
16 According to Mann (1999, p. 165), approximately 75 percent of foreign
private investment in the United States is in longer term, stable investments:
direct investment, bonds with maturities of more than one year, and stocks.
Holman.qxd  4/25/01  2:46 PM  Page 22ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2001 23
REFERENCES
Bank of America. 2000. “The Current Account Deficit: Is a Big Gap a Big Prob-
lem?” Economic and Financial Perspectives, August 25.
The Economist. 2000. “The War of the Worlds,” May 27, p. 76.
Ford, Constance Mitchell. 2000. “Economists Split on Fed’s Strategy to Curb Infla-
tion,” Wall Street Journal, June 3.
Goldman Sachs. 2001a. “Fed Easing: A Three-Legged Stool with Two Missing,”
U.S. Economics Analysis, March 2.
__________. 2001b. The Pocket Chartroom, February.
Greenspan, Alan. 2000a. “The Federal Reserve’s Report on Monetary Policy,” Testi-
mony Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S.
Senate, July 20.
__________. 2000b. “The Federal Reserve’s Semiannual Report on the Economy
and Monetary Policy,” Testimony Before the Committee on Banking and
Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, February 17.
__________. 1999. “The Federal Reserve’s Semiannual Report on the Economy
and Monetary Policy,” Testimony Before the Committee on Banking and
Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, July 22.
International Monetary Fund. 1999. World Economic Outlook, October.
Mann, Catherine L. 1999. Is the U.S. Trade Deficit Sustainable? Washington: Institute
for International Economics.
Mishkin, Frederic S. 2001. The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets.
New York: Addison-Wesley.
Pakko, Michael R. 1999. “The U.S. Trade Deficit and the “New Economy,” Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review, September/October, pp. 11-19.
Warnock, Francis E. 2000. “U.S. International Transactions in 1999.” Federal Reserve
Bulletin, May, pp. 301-14.
Holman.qxd  4/25/01  2:46 PM  Page 23